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The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance· .
Akhil Reed Amart
It's good to be back in Boston, where I spent the 1984-85 year working
(or so I claimed) as a law clerk to Judge Stephen Breyer-who of course
is known to you all now not merely. as Justice Breyer, but as Donahue
Lecturer Breyer.1 Whenever I return to Boston, I feel a thrill not only as a
former Bostonian, but also as a professional student of the Bill of Rights.
For example, it's hard for me to think of the Second Amendment, and its
original vision, without thinking of the Minutemen of Lexington and Con-
cord-a well-regulated, locally organized militia of yeomen guarding
fellow citizens against central tyranny. (In the 1770s, that tyranny came
from London, and in the 1780s and 1790s, many feared that Washington,
D.C. might take up where London had left off.) So too, it's hard to think
of the Third Amendment without thinking of this city, which lived under,
and yet resisted, the intolerable Quartering Act of 1774.
But the relationship between Boston and the Fourth Amendment is
more vexing. Many judges and scholars have claimed, or assumed, that
the Amendment was drafted with the now-famous 1761 Boston writs-of-
assistance case, argued by the great Boston lawyer James Otis, centrally in
mind.2 And yet, as I have noted elsewhere, one fmds remarkably little
mention of this case in debates over the ratification of the Federal Consti-
tution and the drafting of the Bill of Rights.3 The vexed question about
• This Article is based upon a speech that Professor Amar delivered on October 10, 1996 as
pan of the Donahue Lecture Series. The Donahue Lecture Series is a program instituted by the Suffolk
University Law Review to commemorate the Honorable Frank J. Donahue, former faculty member,
trustee, and treasurer of Suffolk University. The Lecture Series serves as a tribute to Judge Donahue's
accomplishments in encouraging academic excellence at Suffolk University Law School. Each lecture
in the series is designed to address contemporary legal issues and expose the Suffolk University
community to outstanding authorities in various fields of law.
t Southmayd Professor, Yale Law School. .
1. See Stephen Breyer, The Donahue Lecture Series: "Administering Justice in the First Cir-
cuif', 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 29 (1990).
2. See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1965); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
582, 604 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25 (1886); see
also Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Founh Amendment, 35 WM. & MARy L. REv. 197,
218-28 (1993) [hereinafter Maclin, Central Meaning].
3. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131, 1176 n.208
(1991) [hereinafter Amar, Bill ofRights].
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the link (or lack thereot) between this city and that Amendment in tum
connects up to other vexed questions about the Amendment. On the
"rights" side, does the Amendment create or presuppose a warrant require-
ment-a rule that all (or almost all) searches and seizures be preceded by
warrants? Must all searches or seizures be justified by "probable cause,"
whatever that means? (By the way, what does "probable cause" mean?)
And on the "remedy" side, does the Amendment require or presuppose the
so-called exclusionary rule, which demands that evidence obtained in
violation of the Amendment be suppressed in criminal cases? These are
questions close to my heart, questions that I have publicly spoken on here
in this city (in historic Faneuil Hall)4 and written about in a law review
headquartered just on the other side of the Charles.s But they are ques-
tions that I would like to revisit. No place seems better than this
place-this special place-to do so. And, with your indulgence, no time
seems better than now.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Let us begin with the words of the Fourth Amendment itself:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or afftnnation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.6
Thus far the reading. Now, the sermon.
Modem debate about the Fourth Amendment swirls around three big
sets of questions. First, what exactly is the relationship between the Fourth
Amendment's fIrst clause, which bans "unreasonable searches and sei-
zures," and its second clause, which addresses warrants? Are all warrant-
less searches and seizures ipso facto unreasonable? If so, why doesn't the
Amendment say this explicitly? If, however, the Amendment simply
means what it says, and does not require warrants, what exactly is the
purpose of the warrant clause?
Second, what precisely does the second clause mean when it speaks of
"probable cause"? Does the Amendment mean what it says in limiting this
standard to warrants? If so-and if some warrantless searches are permit-
ted-then does the Amendment really mean to authorize some warrantless
4. The occasion was a panel discussion on "The History and Legacy of the Writs of Assistance,"
on Feb. 7, 1993, sponsored by the American Bar Association. The proceedings were later broadcast by
C-SPAN, as part of its "America and the Courts" series, in late summer, 1993.
5. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 757 (1994)
[hereinafter Amar, Fourth Amendmentl.
6. U.s. CONST. amend. IV.
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searches lacking in probable cause? Why should all searches with warrants
be held to a higher standard than some searches without warrants? And
whenever the "probable cause" standard does apply, how probable must
probable be? Fifty-one percent? Does this mean that if there is only a
thirty-three percent likelihood that a suspected terrorist is building a bomb
in his house, a warrant may not issue, or a warrantless search would be
per se unreasonable? If all searches and seizures must have probable
cause, what about metal detectors at airports? And what kind of probable
cause must the government have? If the government can prove that there
is a seventy percent likelihood that I am a terrorist, or that illegal machine
guns and bombs are stashed in my house, a warrant to arrest me or to·
search my house seems sensible. But what if the government merely
proves that there is a seventy percent--or one hundred percent!-likeli-
hood that I am a professor, or that my name is Akhil Reed Amar, or that I
have hair on my head, or that skim milk and frozen yogurt are stashed in
my house? Seventy percent is probable, but is that kind of probable cause
enough?
Third, however we defme the Fourth Amendment's rules on the "rights"
side, what should happen as a remedial matter when the government vio-
lates these rights? Does the Amendment require exclusion of illegally ob-
tained evidence? If so, why doesn't it say so clearly? If not, what reme-
dies are presupposed by the Amendment, which proclaims so emphatically
that the rights it recognizes "shall not be violated"?
Each of these three sets of questions has generated its own quite consid-
erable debate in the judiciary and in the academy. In my earlier remarks at
Faneuil Hall, and my earlier article. published just across the Charles, I
tried to show how the right answers to these three sets of questions were
interlinked. I also tried to show how the text of the Amendment really
does mean what it says, and how what it says makes good common sense.
To begin with, the Amendment does not require a warrant for each and
every search or seizure. It simply requires that each and every search or
seizure be reasonable. In the language of the fIrst clause, the Amendment
affrrms the basic "right of the people to be secure . . . against unreason-
able searches and seizures.,,7 An implicit warrant requirement runs counter
to text, history, and common sense.
Textually, as we have seen, the Amendment contains no third clause
explicitly stating that "warrantless searches and seizures are inherently
unreasonable" or explicitly barring all "warrantless searches and seizures."
Many early state constitutions featured search-and-seizure language rather
similar to the Fourth Amendment's, yet none of these constitutions pro-
claimed an explicit warrant requirement.8 In cases construing these state
7. Id.
8. See DEL. CONST. of 1776 (Declaration of Rights) § 17; Mo. CoNST. of 1776 (Declaration of
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constitutions, state court after state court explicitly rejected the claim that,
by implication, warrants were required for all searches and seizures.9 No
leading English or early American commentator, so far as I know, ever
claimed that all searches and seizures required a warrant. No leading fram-
er, so far as I know, ever explicitly articulated a global warrant require-
ment.
Various forms of warrantless searches and seizures were commonplace
at common law and in early America. At common law, according to
Blackstone, a constable by dint of his office had
great original and inherent authority with regard to arrests. He may,
without warrant, arrest anyone for a breach of the peace, committed in
his view, and carry him before a justice of the peace. And, in case of
felony actually committed, or a dangerous wounding whereby felony is
likely to ensue, he may upon probable suspicion arrest the felon; and for
that purpose is authorized (as upon a justice's warrant) to break open
doors:1O
One modern scholar, Professor Thomas Y. Davies, has argued that these
warrantless arrests and intrusions incident to arrest do not squarely rebut
an implicit warrant requirement. Professor Davies' argument, it seems, is
that these arrests and intrusions did not really count as state action, be-
cause they were no greater than a private person's power to make a
"citizen's arrest.,,11 But to the extent that the government authorizes
"citizen's arrests," I should think that such arrests are indeed a form of
state action; the government is in effect deputizing its citizens, just as it
does when it uses the militia or the posse to enforce its laws, or when it
commissions privateers through letters of marque and reprisal.12 Even if
mere governmental permission to effect a "private" arrest is not state ac-
Rights) art. xxm; MAss. CONST. of 1780, pt I, art. XIV; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pL I, art. XIX; N.C.
CONST. of 1776 (Declaration of Rights) art. XI; PA. CONST. of 1776 (Declaration of Rights) art. X;
VA. CONST. of 1776 (Declaration of Rights) § 10; VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. I, § XII; VT. CONST. of
1777, ch. I, § XI.
9. See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 5, at 763 00.11-12 (citing cases).
10. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *292. The clause, "committed in his view," was
first added by Blackstone in his fifth edition, published in 1773.
11. Statement of Professor Thomas Y. Davies, Hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on
Bill to Abolish Fourth Amendment Exclusion of Unconstitutionally Seized Evidence and to Create a
Tort Remedy, March 7, 1995, at 6-8, 11 [hereinafter Davies Testimony] (on file at Suffolk University
Law Review) (an incomplete version of the testimony is available in 1995 WL 231846). Professor
Davies' testimony contains a good many claims about the Fourth Amendment and its history, and
about my own work:, that are in my view untrue or unfair. Today, I shall mention only a few, and my
silence on other issues should not be taken as assent
12. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 11. (outlining Congressional power to issue letters of marque
and reprisal); id. cls. 15-16 (outlining Congressional power over the militia); see also Amar, Bill of
Rights, supra note 3, at 1165-73 (discussing the militia); THE FEDERALIST No. 29 (Alexander Hanril-
ton) (discussing the militia and the "posse comitatus").
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tion, surely a government requirement to arrest is state action; and at com-
mon law, constables were often required to arrest in situations where truly
private persons were, at most, permitted to do SO.13
Most important, contrary to Professor Davies, Blackstone clearly says
that a constable has inherent arrest powers, by dint ofhis office, that range
beyond the citizen's arrest powers of ordinary folk. Blackstone organizes
his discussion of arrest powers as follows: "[I]n general, an arrest may be
made four ways: 1. By warrant; 2. By an officer without a warrant; 3. By
a private person also without a warrant; 4. By an hue and cry.,,14 The
entire structure of Blackstone's analysis thus focuses on the special arrest
powers of certain officers such as sheriffs, justices of the peace, coroners,
constables, and watchmen-these special powers are what separate catego-
ries 2 and 3. This is what Blackstone means when he speaks of the "great
original and inherent authority" of the constable, in contradistinction to the
arrest powers of "a private person,',IS powers discussed in a separate pas-
sage. For example, we have seen that a constable could, for felonies,
"break open doors"16-but a private person generally could not, accord-
ing to Blackstone: "Upon probable suspicion also a private person may
arrest the felon or other person so suspected. But he cannot justify break-
ing open doors to do it.,,17 And for more minor breaches of the peace, a
private person could intervene to separate combatants, but a constable on
the scene had the far greater authority to arrest and imprison the fighters
even after the fisticuffs had ended. Thus, in the above-quoted passage,
Blackstone affmns the constable's right to "without warrant, arrest anyone
for a breach of the peace committed in his view, and carry him off before
a justice of the peace,,,18 but he makes clear in his very next paragraph
that private persons may generally arrest only for felonies. 19 Consider
13. See Davis v. Russell, 5 Bing. 354, 365, 80 Eng. Rep. 1098, 1102 (C.P. 1829), 7 LJ.M.C.
(0.5.) 52, 59; Cowles v. Dunbar, 2 Car. & P. 565, 567-68, 172 Eng. Rep. 257,258 (K.B. 1827); Sam-
uel v. Payne, 1 Doug!. 359, 360, 99 Eng. Rep. 230, 231 (K.B. 1780); 2 MATl'HEW HALE, THE HISTO-
RY OF mE PlEAS OF mE CROWN *82, *84-85, *91-92 (Professional Books Ltd. 1971) (1736).
14. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *289; see also 2 HALE, supra note 13, at *72 (similar).
15. See supra notes 10, 14 and lI!XXlmpanying text. Similarly, Hale ~tinguishes between the
arrest powers of private persons and those of officers by virtue of their office, "virtute officii." 2 HALE,
supra note 13, at *72.
16. Supra note 10 and accompanying text.
17. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *293; see also 2 HALE, supra note 13, at *92 (discussing
"the difference between private persons arresting upon suspicion and constables": "the constable may
break open the door, tho he have no warrant" but "private persons .•. cannot break open doors" upon
suspicion); id. at *82 (similar). But see 1 id. at *588 (muddying the waters on this point). As the more
modem and more consistent commentator on this issue, Blackstone (who had many years to revise his
treatise, once published) is a more reliable compiler of common law circa 1780 than Hale, whose
notes from the 16708 were published many years after his death.
18. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *289.
19. [d. at *292-93; see also id. at *142, *146-53 (making clear that many breaches of the peace
are not felonies). Here too, Hale's analysis closely tracks Blackstone's. See 2 HALE, supra note 13, at
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also the following Blackstone passage, explicitly distinguishing the search
and seizure powers of ordinary citizens from those of constables:
The remaining offences against the public peace are merely misdemean-
ors, and no felonies: as, . . . Affrays. . . . Affrays may be suppressed by
any private person present, who is justifiable in endeavouring to part the
combatants, whatever consequence may ensue. But more especially the
constable, or other similar officer, however denominated, is bound to
keep the peace, and to that purpose may break open doors to suppress an
affray, or apprehend the affrayers, and may either carry them before a
justice, or imprison them by his own authority for a convenient space till
the heat is over.20
Later English case law powerfully supports and sharpens Blackstone's
distinction between the arrest powers of officers and those of citizens. In
the 1780 case of Samuel v. Payne,21 the King's Bench held, in the words
of the reporter, that "A peace officer may justify an arrest on a reasonable
charge of felony, without a warrant, although it should afterwards appear
that no felony had been committed; but a private individual cannot.,,22
The Samuel Court invoked and extended the analysis of Hale's landmark
treatise, The History of the Pleas of the Crown, which, like Blackstone,
emphasized the many special ex officio arrest powers enjoyed by certain
officers.23 Five years later, Lord Mansfield proclaimed in Cooper v.
BoofA that "when a felony has been committed, any person may arrest on
reasonable suspicion. When no felony has been committed, an officer may
arrest on a charge."2S Samuel and Cooper, it appears, were the leading
*88-89 (describing "the original and inherent power in the constable" to "imprison a person" for
"breach of the peace and some misdemeanors. less than felony" and to "arrest suspicious night-walk-
ers" and "men[] that ride armed" though no felony be committed or proved); see also I id. at *587
(offering other examples of constable's power to make "arrests ex officio without any warrant").
20. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *146; see also 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF TIlE
PLEAs OF TIlE CROWN 81 (Amo Press 1972) (1721) (the "Constable hath Authority not only to arrest
those whom he shall see actually engaged in an Affray, but also to detain them till they find Sureties
of the Peace .•. whereas a private Person seems to have no other Power in a bare Affray, not attend-
ed with the Danger of Life, but only to stay the Affrayers till the Heat be over, and then deliver them
to the Constable; (footnotes omitted).
21. I Doug!. 359,99 Eng. Rep. 230 (K.B. 1780).
22. Id. at 359, 99 Eng. Rep. at 230 (footnote omitted).
23. Id. at 360,99 Eng. Rep. at 231; see generally 1 HALE, supra note 13, at *587; 2 HALE, supra
note 13, at *85, *88-98; see also 2 HALE, supra note 13, at *83 (noting that an innocent arrestee is not
bound to submit to a citizen's arrest, but is obliged to submit to "a constable arresting in the Icing's
name''). Blackstone offers a similar accounL 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 10, at *292-93.
24. 4 Doug!. 338, 99 Eng. Rep. 911 (K.B. 1785).
. 25. Id. at 343, 99 Eng. Rep. at 913; see also Lawrence v. Hedger, 3 TaunL 14, 14, 128 Eng. Rep.
6,6 (C.P. 1810) ("Watchmen and beadles have authority at common law to arrest and detain in prison
for examination, persons walking in the streets at night, whom there is reasonable ground to sUSJlCCt of
felony, although there is no proof of a felony having been committed..) (reporter's case summary). For
similar discussions of the special ex officio arrest and detention powers of watchmen, see 4
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English cases on the subject at the time of the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment.
Thus we fmd the New York Supreme Court, in a learned 1829 opinion
by Chief Justice Savage, explicitly invoking Samuel and other authorities
to make clear that a constable, without warrant, could arrest in situations
where private persons could not.26 The precise location of the line sepa-
rating the arrest powers of private citizens from those of officers, by virtue
of their office, was at times blurry, as the line gradually shifted over the
decades. But the fact that such a line existed-that constables, watchmen,
and others had certain special powers of warrantless arrest-was a basic
feature of the leading common law treatises in the late eighteenth centu-
ry-Blackstone, Hale, Hawkins, and so on.
When an arrest did occur, the arresting officer was free to search the
person of the arrestee for evidence or stolen goods, and to do so without a
warrant--even if the arrest was itself warrantless.27 And, at common law,
if a constable without a warrant arrested a person on a mere subjective
hunch, rather than objective probable cause, and the person turned out to
be a felon, the constable's ex post success was an absolute defense against
any trespass or false imprisonment suit.28
Other historical exceptions to a blanket warrant requirement come from
the First Congress-the same body that drafted the Fourth Amendment
itself. One early statute authorized both warrantless searches of certain
ships and warrantless seizures of various items suspected in connection
with customs violations.29 Another early statute authorized warrantless
entry into and inspection of all "houses" and buildings that had been regis-
tered (as required by law) as liquor storerooms or distilleries.30 If any
member of Congress objected to or even questioned these warrantless
searches and seizures on Fourth Amendment grounds, supporters of a
warrant requirement have yet to identify him.
So much for text and history. Now let's consult common sense. Does it
really make sense to insist that each and every search or seizure must be
preceded by a warrant? What about cases of hot pursuit, and other exigent
circumstances? Or when a wife authorizes police to search her husband's
car, and the police reasonably rely upon her authorization? Consider also
the case where security agents look unobtrusively for things in plain, pub-
lic view-say, scanning the crowd at an Olympic event for anything that
BLACKSTONE, supra note 10. at *292; 2 HALE, supra note 13. at *98.
26. Holley v. Mix. 3 Wend. 350. 353-55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829).
27. TELroRD TAYLOR. Two SnroIES IN CONSTITl1l10NAL INTERPRETATION 28-29 (1969).
28. Amar. Fourth Amendment. supra note 5, at 767 & nn.30-33.
29. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. S. § 24. 1 Stat. 29. 43 (repealed 1790). Similar provisions were
passed in 1790. 1793. and 1799. Amar. Fourth Amendment. supra note 5. at 766.
30. Act of Mar. 3. 1791. ch. 15. §§ 25. 29. 1 Stat. 199.205-06.
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might be suspicious. Or think about the vast number of real-life,
unintrusive, nondiscriminatory-reasonable!-searches and seizures to
which modem-day Americans are routinely subjected: metal detectors at
airports, annual auto emissions tests, inspections of closely regulated in-
dustries, public school regimens, border searches, and so on.
But if a warrant requirement makes no textual, historical, or practical
sense, I hear you saying, surely the warrant clause of the Fourth Amend-
ment must mean something. What does the warrant clause mean, and what
is the relation between it and the earlier reasonableness clause?
Just this: broad warrants-warrants that fail to meet the various specifi-
cations of clause two--are inherently unreasonable under clause one. The
Amendment in its words and grammar does not require or prefer warrants:
it limits them. "No Warrants shall issue, but ...."31
Why did the framers seek to limit warrants? Because a lawful warrant
could immunize the officer who carried it out from the trespass suit that
.the citizen victim might otherwise have been free to bring. Indeed, immu-
nity was part of the very deftnition-the purpose-of a lawful warrant.32
Thus, if an officer searched or seized without a warrant, he could be
sued in tort by the citizen whose person, house, papers, or effects had
been trespassed upon. In this tort suit, if the officer's intrusion were
deemed unreasonable, the intrusion would, under Fourth Amendment
clause one, be unconstitutional-and thus any governmental authorization
the officer might claim would fall to the ground. But if the officer could
get a lawful warrant before searching and seizing, he could escape this tort
liability and after-the-fact judicial review. Warrants then, were friends of
the officer, not the citizen; and so warrants had to be strictly limited under
clause two.
A valid warrant, then, was not merely a preclearance of a search or
seizure, but also a preclusion of later tort suits that an outraged citizen
might seek to bring. And note the many advantages of the tort suit over
the warrant. A tort suit would be presided over by a judge; but, in Eng-
land and America, various executive officials claimed the authority to issue
warrants. Even if issued by a judge, a warrant lacked the traditional judi-
cial safeguards of notice and the opportunity to be heard, and adversarial
presentation of argument and evidence by both sides of a dispute. A war-
rant issued ex parte, without the citizen target or his lawyer in the· court-
room to challenge the government's case. (If law professors taught about
warrants in civil procedure courses, rather than criminal procedure courses,
the due process issues raised by ex parte warrants would be easier to see.)
Note also that, in a warrant proceeding, the government could forum-shop
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32. See infra notes 115, 121-22 and accompanying text
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by seeking out the most pro-government magistrate to issue the warrant.
In a tort suit, by contrast, citizen plaintiffs would have more choice. Note
also that a typical warrant proceeding is secretive--elosed to the pub-
lic-in contrast to the open, public tort trial, with ordinary citizens able to
monitor the affair.33 Finally, remember that in a tort suit the key question
of reasonableness is not always a pure question of law, but at times a
question of fact, too, at least in part. And so in our tort suit, key questions
about the reasonableness of government conduct might be decided not by
a single judge, but by a judge sitting with a local jury, twelve good men
and true.
An 1827 King's Bench case, Beckwith v. Philby,34 is illuminating here.
In a trespass suit brought against a constable for a warrantless arrest, Lord
Tenterden C,J. followed Samuel v. Payne, holding that-unlike a private
citizen's arrest where an actual felony must be proved-the constable's
warrantless arrest was justified if the constable merely had a "reasonable
ground to suspect that a felony had been committed" by the arrestee.35
The Chief Justice also proclaimed that:
Whether there was any reasonable cause for suspecting that the plaintiff
had committed a felony, or was about to commit one, or whether he had
been detained in custody an unreasonable time, were questions of fact for
the jury, which they have decided against the plaintiff, and in my judg-
ment most correctly.36
33. On the importance of public trials to monitor possible abuse and corruption, see Akhil Reed
Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 Goo. LJ. 641, 677-81 (1996) [hereinafter
Amar, Sixth Amendmentl.
34. 6 B. & C. 635, 108 Eng. Rep. 585 (K.B. 1827). For parallel reports of·this case. see 5
LJ.M.C. (O.S.) 132,9 D. & R. 487.
35. 6 B. & C. at 638-39. 108 Eng. Rep. at 586. In holding that reasonable suspicion alone would
uphold a constable's arrest, Lord Tenterden went one step beyond Samuel and Cooper. which spoke of
a "charge" of felony. The Court drew support on this point from Lawrence v. Hedger. /d. at 637. 108
Eng. Rep. at 586, 9 D. & R. at 491; see also supra note 25 (discussing Lawrence holding).
36. 6 B. & C. at 638, 108 Eng. Rep. at 586. Lord Tenterden's analysis here is strikingly similar to
the one I earlier attributed to Lord Mansfield in Money v. Leach. 19 Howell's State Trials 1001, 1026
(K.B. 1765),97 Eng. Rep. 1075. 1087. See Amar, Fourth Amendment. supra note 5. at 716 & n.69.
Professor Davies has sharply criticized me for perverting this passage. See Davies Testimony, supra
note II, at 12 n.l2 (describing me as "flat-out wrongj. But, a parallel report of this case. authored by
Blackstone. strongly confirms my initial reading, as do later opinions like Lord Tenterden·s. See Mon-
ey v. Leach. 1 Black. W. 555, 560, 96 Eng. Rep. 320. 323 (K.B. 1765) ("Lord Mansfield, CJ.-What
is a probable cause of suspicion. and what is a reasonable time of detainer. are matters of fact to be
determined by a jury.j In other cases, as I have noted elsewhere, Lord Mansfield was not always a
champion of the jury.
For a case remarkably similar to Bec/cwith. where Abbott, CJ. (soon-to-become Lord
Tenterden), made a very similar point, see Cowles v. Dunbar, 2 Car. & P. 565. 567, 172 Eng. Rep.
257. 258 (K.B. 1827) ("A constable is obliged to act if there is a reasonable charge of felony: whether
there was such here, is for the jury to say.j. Elsewhere in Cowles, the Chief Justice sharply distin-
guished between constables' and private persons' arrest powers./d. at 568, 172 Eng. Rep. at 258.
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Even if a post-search civil suit were tried to a judge, rather than a jury,
we have seen several reasons why the framers preferred open tort suits to
secret warrants. But the jury point is worth emphasizing, for it illustrates
how the Fourth Amendment connects to other parts of our Bill of Rights.
No idea was more central to our Bill of Rights than the idea of the jury-
featured explicitly in the Fifth Amendment Grand Jury Clause, the Sixth
Amendment Petit Jury Clause, and the Seventh Amendment Civil Jury
Clause, and implicitly in many other provisions, from due process to dou-
ble jeopardy.37 Twelve heads in the jury box would often be better-less
idiosyncratic, more representative, less corruptible-than one head on the
judicial bench.38 Juries drawn from local communities might be more
skeptical of imperial edicts than might a federal judge appointed in Wash-
ington.39 Jurors were independent citizens, not on the government pay-
roll.40 To the extent "reasonableness" turned on questions of common
sense, the jury represented the common sense of common people. To the
extent "reasonableness" implicated legal issues, jurors could learn from
judges and help give them feedback that would keep the Constitution in
touch with the people.41 Like the militia of Lexington and Concord, the
jury embodied the spirit of the American Revolution as a local, populist
institution of ordinary folk checking paid, professional officers of the
central government-armies, prosecutors, customs officials, judges, and so
on.
Warrants ran counter to this and so they had to be limited. Why allow
them at all? A good modem-day analogy is the temporary restraining
order. Sometimes, emergency action must be taken to freeze the status quo
and prevent future harm, and so judges may act ex parte, without the
traditional safeguards of adversarial adjudication. But precisely because of
the due process dangers it poses, an ex parte TRO is strictly limited to
situations where there is a risk of "irreparable injury" and a high likeli-
hood of "success on the merits." At common law, a warrant could like-
wise issue when there was a high likelihood-"probable cause"-that a
particular place contained stolen goods. The whole point of the ex parte
warrant was to authorize a search that would bring the stolen goods before
the magistrate. To give the owner of the hideaway a heads-up in advance
of the surprise search might enable him to whisk the goods away-a kind
of irreparable injury to the truth, to the justice system, and to the victim of
the theft seeking to recover his goods.42 The need for a surprise search on
37. See generally Akhil Reed Amar. Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.c. DAVIS
L. REv. 1169, 1169-72 (1995).
38. Amar, Sixth Amendment, supra note 33, at 680-84.
39. Amar, Bill ofRights, supra note 3, at 1186.
40. ld. at 1183-85.
41. ld. at 1186-87.
42. See Bostock v. Saunders, 3 Wils. K.B. 434, 440-42, 95 Eng. Rep. 1141, 1145 (C.P. 1773); 2
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these facts is obviously strong; but without the absolute guarantee of im-
munity provided by a warrant, an officer might hesitate to perform the
surprise search for fear of a future lawsuit.43
But once extended beyond the limited context of the common law war-
rant for stolen goods, warrants had the potential for great evil. If autho-
rized on less than probable cause, they would give government henchmen
absolute power to "round up the usual suspects," rousting political ene-
mies or unpopular groups. And so too if warrants were allowed for items
other than stolen goods or things closely akin to stolen goods-contra-
band, smuggled items, dangerous explosives, and so on. If a warrant could
issue because there was probable cause to believe that there was (innocent)
skim milk in a given house, then no one would be safe.
And so broad warrants had to be banned; this is the meaning of clause
two. But warrantless searches did not pose the same threat precisely be-
cause they were not immune from after-the-fact review of the general
reasonableness of the government intrusion. If a particular warrantless
search were too intrusive; or if the government policy gave officials too
much discretion; or if the search threatened other constitutional values
such as freedom of the press; or if the government policies seemed target-
ed at certain powerless or unpopular minorities; or if in any number of
other ways the search offended what I have called "constitutional reason-
ableness" or common-sense reasonableness, judicial review after the fact
would invalidate the search under clause one, and trespass damages, com-
pensatory and punitive, would deter future violations. And so, to repeat,
the Fourth Amendment did not require warrants; it limited them.
Once we see that this is the right answer to our fIrst set of questions,
about whether the Fourth Amendment requires warrants, we also see how
the right answers to our second and third set of questions-about probable
cause and the exclusionary rule-fall into place.
The Amendment means what it says: all warrants must have probable
cause, and warrantless searches need not always have probable cause, so
long as they are reasonable.44 Ex parte warrants must be limited-just
like ex parte TROs-but the limits applicable to warrants do not always
sensibly apply to all other searches. Particular description, oath or affIrma-
tion, and so on are necessary features of warrants, but not of all searches
and seizures. So too with probable cause. Indeed, to limit warrants, we
Black. W. 912, 914-16, 96 Eng. Rep. 539, 540 (C.P. 1773) (recording remarks of De Grey, CJ.).
43. See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REv. 881, 883,
907,917 (1991) (portraying warrant as a "safe harbor" insulating police from liability). Stuntz's imag-
ery was beautifully foreshadowed by Lord Maosfield: '''The statute has chalked out a way by which
[the government searcher] may be safe." Cooper v. Boot, 4 Doug\. 339, 349, 99 Eng. Rep. 911, 916
(K..B. 1785). .
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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must insist that a certain kind of probable cause exists, as well as a certain
level of probability. To support an ex parte warrant without notice to the
citizen target, there must be probable cause to believe that a given place
contains something very suspicious-like stolen goods-and that the own-
er of the premises, if given notice in advance, would spirit away the
goods, or defy a subpoena. But even if ex parte warrants should almost
never issue for innocent mere evidence (say, skim milk in refrigerators)
often government will properly want to search for or seize such things
with advance notice-inspecting restaurant food for contamination, or
wires for electrical safety, or cars for emissions, or in a thousand other
cases. And so, once again, we see that the "probable cause" test for stolen
goods cannot be a global test for all searches and seizures. Of course, in
some particular contexts-the inherently intrusive arrest of one's "person"
for example-even a warrantless intrusion might generally call for proba-
ble cause, or more, in order to be reasonable overall.
History strongly supports this textual and structural analysis. No leading
framer or founding era commentator, so far as I have seen, ever pro-
claimed that every search or seizure required probable cause. On the con-
trary, the First Congress clearly authorized various suspicionless searches
of ships and liquor storehouses; and we have already noted the common
law rule allowing an officer without ex ante probable cause to justify an
arrest if he played a mere subjective hunch and turned up an actual fel-
on.45
Our reading also squares with common sense and modem life. Every
day, modem government officials engage in a vast number of relatively
unintrusive and nondiscriminatory searches without probable cause and
often without individualized suspicion: border searches, metal detectors,
OSHA audits, building code inspections, emissions tests, and so on. Surely
these are not all unconstitutional.
Our analysis of Fourth Amendment rights also clarifies Fourth Amend-
ment remedies. Here too the Amendment means what it says. It does not
call for exclusion of evidence in criminal cases but rather presupposes
civil trespass suits. The "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects" pr:esupposes and conjures up tort law, which
protects persons and property from unreasonable invasions. Here too,
textual analysis is strongly supported by history-no framer ever argued
for exclusion, nor did any early commentator, or judge-and by common
sense: unlike tort law, exclusion rewards the guilty but gives absolutely
zilch to the innocent citizen, whom the government seeks to hassle. (If
officers expect to fmd nothing and indeed fmd nothing, there is nothing to
exclude, and no deterrence under an exclusionary rule.)46
45. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying texL
46. For a general discussion of this "upside-down effect." see Akhil Reed Amar. The Future of
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If we seek a paradigmatic illustration of all of these themes in action,
we should ponder two related English cases handed down in the 1760s,
Wilkes v. Wood'7 and Entick v. Carrington.48 These cases, decided by
Lord Camden,49 were, I submit, the most famous colonial-era cases in all
America-the OJ. Simpson and Rodney King cases of their day. Anned
with sweeping warrants issued by executive officials, various government
henchmen broke into Englishmen's houses, searched their papers, arrested
their persons, and rummaged through their effects, in hopes of fmding the
authors and publishers of anti-government pamphlets. The citizens tres-
passed upon brought tort suits against the henchmen, who tried to hide
behind their sweeping warrants. But Lord Camden found these war-
rants-which lacked (among other things) probable cause under oath, and
which had issued not for stolen goods but for private papers-null and
void. Since the warrants were illegal, civil juries, aided by Camden's in-
structions, found the intrusions unjustified, and piled on massive punitive
damages against the henchmen to send a message to the government and
deter future abuse.
II. BOSTON
What, you might ask, does any of this have to do with Boston, Massa-
chusetts, or the writs of assistance? Let me ftrst trace the elements of my
story that link up to Boston and Massachusetts generally; and then, in
closing, I shall say a few words about the writs of assistance.
I have sometimes said that the three best things about my job are June,
July, and August. This is not quite true, of course, but the summer months
do give me a chance to catch my breath each year. And this summer, my
wife and I spent a few days visiting friends in Maine-a state, you will all
recall, that began as a district of Massachusetts. You will not be surprised
to hear that I insisted that we visit the beautiful seaport town of Camden,
Maine, where I conftimed that the township was indeed named in honor
of Lord Camden in the late 1760s.5O In fact the new Town of Camden
seal, chosen in a competition held in June, 1994, features a quite hand-
some portrait of Lord Camden. Massachusetts was hardly alone in honor-
ing the judge of Wilkes and Entick. Consider, for example, Camden, New
Jersey and Camden, South Carolina. And-although I love the Red Sox,
and have spent some of my happiest moments in Fenway-I should re-
mind you that the Baltimore Orioles play their home games in Maryland's
Constitutional Crimi1lll1 Procedure, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. (fonhcoming 1997).
47. 19 Howell's State Trials, 1153 (C.P. 1763),98 Eng. Rep. 489.
48. 19 Howell's State Trials, 1029 (C.P. 1765),95 Eng. Rep. 807.
49. Technically, Chief Justice Charles Pratt did not become Lord Camden until after Wilkes.
50. REUEL ROBINSON, HIsToRY OF CAMDEN AND ROCKPORT MAINE 85-86 (1907).
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historic Camden Yards. Let us also remember the other major figure in
these cases, the plaintiff John Wilkes. Americans across the continent
adored this champion of liberty, as any map will show: consider Wilkes-
Barre, Pennsylvania; Wilkes County, Georgia; and Wilkes County, North
Carolina. If an American family had a son in 1800, three of the most
popular names around were Jefferson, Franklin, and Wilkes. (Yes, John
Wilkes Booth was indeed named after the plaintiff in Wilkes v. Wood.sl )
If we count Maine as part of Massachusetts in 1769 (as indeed it was)
we have already covered seven of the original thirteen colonies. This, it
seems to me, rather powerfully supports my claim about the prominence
of these two men, and of these two paradigm cases, in British North
America.
As we shall see in a few moments, the 1761 Boston writs of assistance
case, though important, may well have been less significant in the immedi-
ate debates leading up to the Fourth Amendment. Part of the reason is
geographic. Boston has long fancied itself as "the Hub"--of Massachu-
setts; of New England; of the American Revolution; of the medical profes-
sion; indeed, of the world. But in the early 1760s, before a continental
consciousness swept the land, London was "the Hub." Each American
colony had its own unique founding, history, charter, and relationship with
England. Americans in diverse and far-flung British North American colo-
nies were tied together in a hub-and-spoke configuration, with the mother
country and King at the center-rather like the early twentieth-century
British Commonwealth of Nations including Canada, India, Australia, New
Zealand, and so on. In 1760, Boston, New York, Philadelphia and
Charleston often followed legal and political events in London at least as
closely as they followed developments in each other, or in other colonies.
Of course, all this began to change in the 1760s, but the 1761 Boston
writs of assistance case looms larger in retrospect than it did in its day,
outside Boston.
But even if Boston is not the Hub of the Universe, surely it is the hub
of this state. Let us now turn to a few general items from this city and this
state and see how they fit into our story.
Begin with the words of the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, drafted
by a convention that sat first across the Charles in Cambridge and then
here in Boston:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and
seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All
warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation
of them be not previously supported by oath or affinnation, and if the
order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places,
51. 19 Howell's State Trials, 1153 (C.P. 1763).98 Eng. Rep. 489.
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or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be
not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of
search, arrest, or seizure; and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases,
and with the formalities, prescribed by the laws.52
The language, logic and structure of the Massachusetts Constitution's
Article XIV rather clearly foreshadow the federal Fourth Amendment. (In
turn Article XIV itself borrowed from and clarified the language of the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776.) The first clause of Article XIV af-
firms a right to be secure against unreasonable intrusions, and later claus-
es seek to limit warrants, not require or prefer them. The pivotal word
"therefore" logically linking the two halves of Article XIV rather clearly
says that overbroad warrants-not warrantless searches-are per se unrea-
sonable. Nowhere is there a third clause in Article XIV requiring warrants
for all searches and seizures, and the clear tone of the Article seems skep-
tical towards warrants. "All warrants ... are contrary to ... right [un-
less] . . . ; and no warrant ought to be issued but . . . .,,53 Warrants here
are heavies, not heroes. And the clear language of the first sentence of
Article XIV-a complete and self-contained legal command-gives the lie
to those scholars who dismiss the clear general rule of "reasonableness" in
the federal Fourth as a drafting mistake, or an ill-considered textual hic-
CUp.54
Massachusetts' Article XIV was later borrowed virtually verbatim by
the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, and served as a prototype for
52. MAss. CoNST. of 1780, pt. I, art. XIV.
53. Id.
54. See Maclin, Central Meaning, supra note 2, at 208-10; Davies Testimony, supra note 11, at
11-16. For especially vivid examples of a standalone reasonableness requirement for all searches and
seizures, omitting all mention of warrants, see I3 THE Docl1MENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTIIVnON 239 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino cds., 1981) (recording Richard
Henry Lee's proposed amendments, September 27, 1787) (''That the Citizens shall not be exposed to
unreasonable searches, seizures of their papers, houses, persons, or property"); Leuers from the Feder-
al Farmer (VI), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANn-FEDERAliST 256, 262 (Herbert J. Storing ed.,
1981) (stating a man should be "subject to no unreasonable searches or seizures of his person, papers
or effects"); DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF THE CoMMONWEALTIf OF MAssA-
awSETI'S HELD IN THE YEAR 1788, at 86-87 (Boston, William White, Printer to the Commonwealth,
1856) (February 6, 1788 amendment proposing that the people should be protected against "unreason-
able searches and seizures of.their persons, papers or possessions").
Professor Maclin tries to downplay the status of the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amend-
ment by arguing that "undisputed history" shows that the Amendment's final wording was due to "a
single congressman" who rewrote the Amendment in a last-minute style committee and slipped his
rewrite past an unwary House. See Maclin, Central Meaning, supra note 2 at 208-09. In fact, however,
House records contradict Maclin's account the Amendment contained an independent reasonableness
clause before the style committee was even created. See 3 Docl1MENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CoNGRESS 1789-91: HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOURNAL 159 (Linda Grant DePauw ed.,
1m) (recording independent reasonableness clause, as in the Amendment's final version, in place as
of August 21, 1789); id. at 165 (appointing style committee on August 22, 1789).
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early versions of the federal Fourth. Thus, the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion of 1788 called for a federal amendment affIrming that "every freeman
has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and siezures [sic]
of his person, his papers and his property."ss Ratifying conventions in
New York and North Carolina proposed virtually identical language, and
all three states went on to condemn overbroad warrants-not warrantless
searches-as "therefore" unreasonable-"grievous," "oppressive," and
"dangerous."S6 In his fIrst draft of the federal Fourth in the First Con-
gress, James Madison likewise spoke of the people's right "to be secured
in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other property, from
all unreasonable searches and seizures."S7
The fIrSt clause of Article XIV also plainly foreshadows the "persons,
houses, papers, and effects" language of the federal Fourth, with "posses-
sions" used as the Massachusetts residual catch-all-all other important
stuff-instead of its close cousin "effects." This confmns that we should
indeed construe "effects" generously, to avoid gaping holes in Fourth
Amendment coverage. Professor Thomas Y. Davies has recently argued
that "ships" were simply not "effects" under the Fourth Amendment.S8
His motivation, it seems, is to explain how the Amendment could indeed
require warrants despite the clear early history of warrantless searches of
ships. But I have not seen any major founding-era statements making this
argument about ships and the Fourth Amendment; and the "all posses-
sions" language of Article XIV clearly suggests a broad scope for the
principle banning unreasonable searches and seizures-as does the analo-
gous sweeping catchall "property" language of the Virginia, New York,
and North Carolina ratifying conventions, and of Madison's fIrSt draft. The
"effects" gambit tries to save a warrant requirement, but ends up dismem-
bering the Fourth Amendment. Taken to its logical conclusion, the refusal
to give effect to the broad intended sweep of "effects"S9 would leave us
with an Amendment that applies only to persons, houses and papers. The
Supreme Court has, thank goodness, never thought so; nor, so far as I am
aware, has any state or lower federal court. Shall we say that office build-
ings are not protected by the Fourth Amendment because they are not
"houses"? Or that computers and floppy disks are wholly outside the
scope of the Amendment because they are not "papers"? Or that cars are
wholly unprotected because they are like ships? Surely true friends of the
55. EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BilL OF RIoms AND WHAT IT MEANs TODAY 184 (1957).
56. [d. at 184, 191, 200-01.
57. [d. at 2m.
58. Davies Testimony, supra note 11, at 5 & 0.2.
59. See BLACK'S LAw DICI10NARY 605 (4th ed. 1968) (offering one quote that the word "effects"
is a tenn "more comprehensive than the word 'goods"'; and another definition of "effects" as "every
kind of property, real and personal").
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Amendment should reject such an outlandish and crabbed approach.
Professor Davies' gambit, I fear, would truly be the worst of all worlds,
for even if we accepted his invitation, it cannot lead to a warrant require-
ment. Such a requirement would still lack affirmative textual, historical,
and practical support: if the Amendment really always requires warrants,
why does it not say so, why did no framer or early commentator say so,
and how are we to deal with metal detectors of persons, building code
inspections of houses, and regulatory oversight of business papers? And
even if "ships" somehow weren't "effects," "persons" on ships surely were
"persons"; and they, too were detained-seized, temporarily-without
warrants under early ship statutes. (And in arrests, and in border searches,
and so on.) So too, early statutes authorized warrantless searches of "hous-
es" storing liquor, as we have seen. Rather than claiming that all of these
searches and seizures were simply beyond the Fourth Amendment's scope,
surely it makes more sense to say that the Amendment applies broadly,
but does not always require warrants.
But the Davies gambit is nevertheless illuminating because it illustrates
something I have argued all along: the overreading of some clauses often
leads to the underprotection of others, and a rigorous warrant requirement
creates hydraulic pressure to deny that certain intrusions are indeed Fourth
Amendment searches and seizures.60
If "effects" and "all possessions" really are best read as rather sweeping
catchalls, why did both Massachusetts' Article XIV and the federal Fourth
bother to specify "persons," "houses," and "papers"? Precisely to remind
us, I suggest, of the heightened sensitivity government should show to-
wards searches and seizures of these three specially-named items. Houses
are often more private than other buildings; diaries and other private pa-
pers are often our dearest possessions (and raise large issues of free ex-
pression, as do all political papers); and searches and seizures of our bod-
ies-our persons-obviously call for special sensitivity. Note how, in
Wilkes and Entick, intrusions occurred against persons, houses, and pa-
pers-with bodily arrests and the ransacking of secret cabinets in homes in
search of personal and political papers-and so here, too, we see the obvi-
ous prominence of these paradigm cases in both the Massachusetts and the
federal Constitutions. (Personal and political papers were not really at
issue in the Boston writs-of-assistance case; and the main focus of concern
seems to have been searches of buildings rather than persons.) Note also
that both constitutions speak of "warrants" and not "writs"-yet again
highlighting the English general warrant cases more than the Boston writ
case.
When we turn from the Massachusetts Constitution to early judicial
60. See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 5. at 768-69,783 & n.97.
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pronouncements in Massachusetts, we fmd further confIrmation of our
general story. In the 1850 case of Rohanv. Sawin,61 the Supreme Judicial
Court, meeting here in Boston, held that a warrant was not required for
arrest under either the national or the Massachusetts Constitution.62 The
Rohan Court, presided over by the great Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, made
clear that the "private" citizen's arrest power was "much more restricted"
than the power of "constables, and other peace-officers, acting officially,"
to effect warrantless arrests.63 Rohan cited the landmark Samuel v. Payne
case of 1780, and quoted with approval as "direct authority" a key passage
of Lord Tenterden's opinion in Beckwith v. Philby.64 The Rohan Court
also invoked another English case, involving a warrantless arrest by a con-
stable, for the proposition that in such cases a jury should consider
"whether the circumstances ... [in the case] afforded the [constable] rea-
sonable ground to suppose that the ... [arrestee] had committed a felo-
ny.'>65 Finally, the Rohan Court made clear that, as a matter of law, an
officer could arrest without warrant even in a case where a warrant would
have been easy to get; warrants were not preferred.66
Six years after Rohan, the same Massachusetts high court upheld a
warrantless seizure of liquors from a wagon.67 The statute involved in
this case, Jones v. Root,68 vested special warrantless seizure and arrest
power in certain officers. The court briskly upheld the statute and affirmed
the trial court's instruction that the jury should fmd for the plaintiff only if
it determined that the defendant officers detained the plaintiff's innocent
horse and wagon "for a longer time than was reasonably necessary" to
remove the offending liquors from the wagon.69
Three years after that, in 1859, the court re-emphasized that Article
XN'did not prefer warrants, or require them; it sought to limit them. And
so the court rejected the idea that an ex parte warrant could issue based on
probable cause to believe that a debtor was concealing assets or property.
That kind of probable cause, suggested the court, was not close enough to
61. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 281 (1850).
62. [d. at 285.
63. [d.
64. [d. at 284.
65. [d. at 284 (emphasis added) (citing Davis v. RusseU. 5 Bing. 354, 365, 130 Eng. Rep. 1098,
1102 (C.P. 1829». Elsewhere, the Davis Court Chief Justice had this to say: "For though a private
individual cannot arrest upon bare suspicion, a constable may. This has been decided in so many cas-
es, that it is unnecessary to refer to them; and unless the law were so, there would be no security for
person or property." 5 Bing. at 363-64, 130 Eng. Rep. at 1101. .
66. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 285-86; see also HoUey v. Mix, 3 Wend. 350, 353 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829)
(affIrming power of warrantless arrest "whether there is time to obtain [a warrant] or not").
67. Jones v. Root, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 435, 439 (1856).
68. 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 435 (1856).
69. [d. at 436 (emphasis added).
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the kind of probable cause supporting warrants for stolen goods. Here is
what the court said:
[I]t cannot be doubted that by adoption of the 14th article of the Declara-
tion of Rights it was intended strictly and carefully to limit, restrain and
regulate the granting and issuing of warrants ... to the general class of
cases, in and to the furtherance of the objects of which they had before
been recognized and allowed ... , and certainly not so to vary, extend
and enlarge the purposes for and occasions on which they might be
used....
. . . Certainly no person ought to be compelled to disclose any facts
or information to be given as evidence . . . until he has at least had an
opportunity of urging his objections . . . [before] some competent judicial
tribunal.70
So much for search and seizure rights. On the remedy side, this is what
the great Justice Joseph Story, who would later become the Dane Profes-
sor of Law at Harvard, had to say in a famous circuit case decided here in
Boston in 1822:
In the ordinary administration of municipal law the right of using evi-
dence does not depend, nor, as far as I have any recollection, has ever
been supposed to depend upon the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the
mode, by which it is obtained. . .. [T]he evidence is admissible on
charges for the highest crimes, even though it may have been obtained
by a trespass upon the person, or by any other forcible and illegal
means.... In many instances, and especially on trials for crimes, evi-
dence is often obtained from the possession of the offender by force or
by contrivances, which one could not easily reconcile to a delicate sense
of propriety, or support upon the foundations of municipal law. Yet I am
not aware, that such evidence has upon that account ever been dismissed
for incompetency.71
Nineteen years later, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, sitting
here in Boston, in a case from Suffolk(!) and Nantucket counties, also
flatly rejected the exclusionary rule:
If the search warrant were illegal, or if the officer serving the warrant
exceeded his authority, the party on whose complaint the warrant issued,
or the officer, would be responsible for the wrong done; but this is no
good reason for excluding the papers seized as evidence.72
(Elsewhere in the opinion, the court quoted extensively from Entick v.
70. Robinson v. Richardson, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 454, 457, 458 (1859).
71. United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 843, 844 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No,
15,551).
72. Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 MeL) 329, 337 (1841).
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Carrington73 and paid tribute to "the able opinion of Lord Camden.,,14
The Court also passingly mentioned the writs of assistance, but not Otis
by name.rs
As late as 1883, the leading evidence treatise in America, pub-
lished-you guessed it-here in Boston, proclaimed illegally obtained evi-
dence universally admissible in English and American COurts.16 (The trea-
tise was authored by Cambridge resident Simon Greenleaf, who succeeded
Story to the Dane Professorship at Harvard.) And the greatest evidence
scholar of the twentieth century, and one of the most distinguished legal
scholars ever-the Harvard-educated giant John Henry Wigmore-led a
lifelong crusade against the illogic and injustice of the exclusionary rule.
His encyclopedic, multivolume treatise was of course published-where
else?-in Boston.n
More recently, alas, one of Boston's main contributions to Fourth
Amendment scholarship has, I think, missed the mark. I have in mind a
recent article authored by Professor Tracey Maclin of the Boston Universi-
ty Law School. Now, I admire much of Professor Maclin's earlier work,
and was privileged to share the stage with him, and several others, in
Faneuil Hall in early 1993. But I am afraid I cannot accept many of the
things Professor Maclin has written in a 1994 article in the Southern Cal-
ifornia Law Review, in direct response to my own article published earlier
that year.J8
In a nutshell, here are a few of my biggest objections. Professor Maclin
argues that the Fourth Amendment embodies a "warrant preference"
rule.19 But where, precisely, does this come from as a binding constitu-
tional principle? Not from the text, Professor Maclin admits.so If it comes
from history-and Professor Maclin himself invokes a good deal of his-
tory, at a certain level of generality-it would be nice to see a stream of
early statements that "warrants are preferred." This is exactly the evidence
I challenged scholars to uncover, and in a seventy-two page article, Pro-
73. 19 Howell's State Trials, 1029 (C.P. 1765),95 Eng. Rep. 807.
74. 43 Mass. (2 MeL) at 334; see also id. at 334-36.
75. [d. at 336.
76. See 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 254a, at 325-26 (Simon
Greenleaf Croswell ed., 14th rev. ed. 1883).
77. See JOHN HENRy WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALs AT CoMMON LAw (3d. ed. 1940).
78. See generally Tracey Maclin, When the CUTe for the Fourth Amendment is Worse Than the
Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Maclin, Fourth Amendment].
79. [d. at 6-7.
80. [d. at 7. According to Professor Maclin, "[t]he text, of course, provides no answers" to many
Fourth Amendment questions. [d. at 9. I suggest that it does provide formulas-like constitutional
reasonableness, and strict limits on warrants-and that it most clearly does not support Professor
Maclin's general "warrant preference" rule.
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fessor Maclin cites no such statement. Not one! In fact, as we have seen,
the framers did not require or "prefer" warrants. They sought to limit
them.8t In trying to minimize various obvious historical exceptions to a
warrant requirement or preference, Professor Maclin says that "early
Americans did not always practice what they preached."82 But as noted,
we have no evidence that they preached a "warrant preference" or a "war-
rant requirement," and lots of evidence contra. Professor Maclin offers an
analytic argument that those framers who hated general warrants would
likely have despised "warrantless searches exhibiting the same character-
istics that marked general warrants.,,83 But my analytic counter-argument
is that lawful warrants necessarily immunized-by defmition-and war-
rantless searches did not. Thus, warrantless searches never shared this
"same characteristic." Professor Maclin, I think, fails to come to grips
with this basic logic (or with my related discussion of how a modem judi-
cial preclearance as opposed to preclusion system might sometimes be
appropriate84).
Over and over, Professor Maclin proclaims that my reading leaves war-
rantless searches unregulated-that federal officers can search "whenever
and wherever they want" with "absolutely no criteria" under my model.85
81. Professor Maclin mocks my focus on a "warrant requirement" rather than a "warrant prefer-
ence"-a warrant requirement is, he says, a "straw man." [d. at 6, 7. But many respected scholars and
judges have indeed read the Fourth Amendment to implicitly require warrants. See Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); Harris v. Unit-
ed States, 331 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
582,595,602,605, 609 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 156 (1925); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. em. L. REv. 47,
47-48 (1974) (describing the logic of a "thoughtful and strict grammarian"). A recent LEXIS search
revealed 60 times more Supreme Court cases referring to a "warrant requirement" than to a "warrant
preference." For legal scholarship, the ratio was 40 to 1. In general, the Constitution requires
things-even though these requirements are not always absolute. It rarely "prefers" things-a word not
in the Fourth Amendment, or in the relevant passages of the Frankfurter opinions Professor Maclin
himself cites. See Maclin, Fourth Amendment, supra note 78, at 7 n.28. These opinions rest on a syn-
tactical inferenee--that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, and that warrants are thus re-
quired. But believers in this implied textual requirement usually concede that this implicit requirement
must yield in truly exceptional or exigent cases, as must even explicit textual requirements, in their
view. See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 5, at 762 n.8. Far from being a "straw man," this
implicit textual argument-vividly championed by Felix Frankfurter-is in fact the doctrinal font of
whatever warrant requirement or warrant preference still exists in today's caselaw. It is also the most
plausible textual argument for warrants-even though, in the end, it is wrong.
82. Maclin, Fourth Amendment, supra note 78, at 11.
83. [d. at 12.
84. Compare id. at 7 (chiding me for never discussing or confronting the ways in which a warrant
preference rule might restrain the police), with Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 5, at 800, 810
(discussing and confronting just this issue, and explaining how a suitably tailored preclearance system
might be reasonable, and far better than a global warrant requirement scheme); compare Maclin,
Fourth Amendment, supra note 78, at 5 n.22 (making a similar suggestion without realizing its connec-
tion to my preclearance argument), with id. at 32 n.142 (partially describing my preclearance argument
and labelling it "nonsense").
85. Maclin, Fourth Amendment, supra note 78, at 19,33. For similar claims, see id. at 40 (Amar's
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This is a rather serious misstatement of my views; I offered up many
pages of analysis mapping out various regimes and rules for implementing
a reasonableness requirement with bite-what I have called "constitutional
reasonableness".86 (He also attributes to me a simple "cost-benefit" ap-
proach that I explicitly rejected.)87 Contrary to Professor Maclin's repeat-
ed assertions, I never claimed that the framers were "unconcerned" about
warrantless intrusions;88 the whole point of the Fourth Amendment's first
clause, I have stressed, was precisely to regulate these intrusions and thus
constrain every species of arbitrary or oppressive government. Elsewhere,
he repeatedly claims that "Amar says civil juries should decide"89 the
meaning of reasonableness, but in at least a half-dozen places,90 I made
clear that legislators, administrators, and judges would also play key roles
under my reading of the Amendment-and that in many situations, juries
should not decide.
Professor Maclin seems to prefer a (presumptive) probable cause rule
for all searches and seizures, but here too he fails to show where this rule
or preference comes from as a constitutional principle.91 The text does not
"model provides no criteria or standards"); iii. at 42 (Amar's "model will not restrain police power and
discretion"); iii. at 66 ("Under Amar's proposal, all standards and procedural safeguards would be cast
to the winds"); see also id. at 13 (Amar is convinced "that warrantless searches are generally constitu-
tional"). I believe that warrantless searches are not per se unreasonable; but of course I never sug-
gested that they are per se reasonable. And under my model, even when government gets a piece of
paper it calls a "warrant," with "probable cause" that would satisfy Professor Maclin's "warrant prefer-
ence" scheme and his definition of "probable cause," government should sometimes lose, as I make
clear in analyzing and criticizing Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). See Amar, Fourth·
Amendment, supra note 5, at 805-06. Professor Maclin nowhere mentions this.
86. See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 5, at 804-11, 816-19. Professor Maclin shields all
this from his readers; remarkably, he nowhere describes or even mentions my model of "constitutional
reasonableness."
87. Compare Maclin, Fourth Amendment, supra note 78, at 12 n.46, with Amar, Fourth Amend-
ment, supra note 5, at 804 n.168.
88. See Maclin, Fourth Amendment, supra note 78, at 9-10, 12 & nn.47, 49, 16, 19 & n.84.
89. Id. at 32; see also iii. at 3, 9, 12 n.46, 27 n.121, 31, 40, 65-67.
90. See Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 5, at 759 (calling on appellate judges to openly
fashion "criteria of reasonableness"), 782 (speaking of "judges and juries"), 810 (proposing "judicial
preclearance"), 814 n.216 (discussing "administrative and judicial" substitutes for juries), 816 (endors-
ing "[a]tleast four overlapping ... non-mutually exclusive enforcement regimes," only one of which
focused on juries), 817 (encouraging judges to rule certain intrusions unreasonable as a matter of law,
especially in situations involving possible jury insensitivity to certain constitutional values), 817 n. 226
(elaborating this point>, 817 (describing role for jury only if "legislature, administrator, and judge have
all accepted a search or seizure as reasonable"), 819 n.233 (reiterating, in my fInal footnote, that my
proposed model "does not place sole reliance on civil juries''); see also iii. at 758 (foreshadowing role
of legislatures, administrators, and judges, as well as juries).
91. Maclin, Fourth Amendment, supra note 78, at 25-28. The question of where constitutional
principles come from is obviously a fundamental one. Professor Maclin's general proposals lack textu-
al support; are contradicted by history; require rejecting the results of many precedents; and often
make little practical sense as strongly presumptive rules. They also fail to connect the Fourth Amend-
ment structurally to other constitutional clauses and principles. Government must be limited, but Pr0-
fessor Maclin's rules fail to limit it in the right ways, as measured by all these met-
HeinOnline -- 30 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 75 1996-1997
1996l THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 75
provide such a global rule, and again he points to no explicit framing
statement. And if it is a constitutional rule, why and how may it some-
times be ignored, as Professor Maclin seems in passing to concede it som-
etimes must? On his premises, exigency might explain why a "warrant
requirement" should yield if there is truly no time to get a warrant; but
temporal exigency cannot explain why a warrantless search should ever be
allowed on somethirig less than "probable cause," if "probable cause"
really is a global rule. Why, in Professor Maclin's world, should a war-
rantless search ever require less than does a search under warrant? His
explicit answer in a footnote is that a truly global probable cause rule
would not be "reasonable" for things like metal detectors.92 But to say
this is to concede one of my main points and to accept the ultimate touch-
stone of reasonableness. Elsewhere, Professor Maclin garbles my discus-
sion of the kind of probable cause that the warrant clause presupposes.
Because of the garbling, he errs when he says that I have "ignore[d] the
text of the Warrant Clause.'t93 (Is it possible that this shoe is on his foot?)
Professor Maclin also makes many troubling claims about Fourth
Amendment remedies-and in the process at times misstates my position
and at other times ignores mycounterarguments. But rather than dwelling
on all this, let me in closing turn to an issue that Professor Maclin has
induced me to rethink: the 1761 writs-of-assistance controversy.
Professor Maclin thinks that this controversy was rather central to the
thinking that underlay the Fourth Amendment.94 In the past, I have been,
for reasons I shall soon explain, more dubious of this. But nothing in my
general analytic argument hinges on minimizing the 1761 writs-of-assis-
tance affair or, for that matter, the later writs-of-assistance cases in other
colonies. Indeed, I believe that a careful look at writs of assistance can
actually bolster my analytic claim that warrants were dangerous devices
rather than globally preferred instruments. And so, in the spirit of the Hub,
let me close my remarks here in Boston by accepting the invitation of one
of Boston's leading Fourth Amendment scholars to say a few new words
rics-modalities-of constitutional interpretation. His basic approach is to "limit" government by
yanking words and concepts from one clause, and trying to stuff them in another where they do not
fit-textuaIly, historically, structurally, practically, and so on. My own model of constitutional reason-
ableness also limits government, but, I submit, in a more fitting way, as measured by the proper mo-
dalities of constitutional argumenL
92. [d. at 27 n.121. His only other argument is that somehow metal detector searches and the like
are not "typical." [d. Why not? As a matter of numbers, searches and seizures without probable cause
loom large today. A better approach, I suggest, is to say that such cases are, in today's world, quite
typical, but that other features of these searches-tbeir unintrusiveness, their evenhandedness, their
legitimate justifications, and so on-may render them constitutionally reasonable.
93. [d. at 6 n.25. For more discussion of why and how the text of the warrant clause presupposes
only a certain kind of probable cause, see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying texL
94. Maclin, Fourth Amendment, supra note 78, at 13-25; Maclin, Central Meaning, supra note 2,
at 218-28.
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about the Boston writs-of-assistance controversy, commonly (if somewhat
loosely) known as Paxton's Case.9S
m. WRITS OF ASSISTANCE
Let me begin by explaining why I spent so little time addressing
Paxton's Case96 and Otis in my earlier article on the Fourth Amendment.
So far, scholars seem to have uncovered only one major direct reference to
Paxton in the debates about the ratification of the Constitution and the
drafting of the Bill of Rights. And the sole major reference came from a
pseudonymous pamphlet that we now know was authored by Mercy Otis
Warren, the sister of the great Boston lawyer James Otis, who argued
Paxton's Case.'J7
It is often noted that John Adams wrote the following about Otis' argu-
ment: "Then and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to
the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Indepen-
dence was bom.'J98 What is less often noted is that Adams wrote these
words more than fifty years after the event. Sometimes, the first act of a
grand historical drama is much more clear in retrospect than at the time.
And if Boston has long fancied itself the Hub, so too John Adams at times
fancied himself the Hub, the Center of All Things. Surely, the frrst act of
the Revolution, in Adams' mind, had to take place in Boston, with Adams
in the room.99 (Never mind how many others were watching; indeed, Ad-
ams may have preferred to see himself as one of a select few "in" at the
beginning.) In a similar v_ein, one historian has noted that Otis's speech
"was not reported in the newspapers of the period and circulated to the
99.9 percent of the population that surely did not hear it. Of those present,
apparently John Adams was the only one who was sufficiently impressed
to take notes on what was said and he gave us the full account of it some
fifty years after Otis delivered it."IOO
To be sure, later writs-of-assistance controversies arose in other colo-
95. See Paxton's Case of the Writ of Assistance, in JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPoRTS OF CASES
ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MAsSACHU-
SETTS BAY BE1WEEN 1761 AND 1772 at 51 (Boston, LinIe, Brown & Co., 1865) [hereinafter
QUINCY'S REPoRTS]; id. app. I at 395-540 (recording Horace Gray's notes) [hereinafter Gray's notes];
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 604 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (alluding to Paxton's
Case); Maclin, Fourth Amendment, supra note 78, at 13 (discussing Paxton's Case). On the slight im-
precision of label here, see M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF AssISTANCE CASE 147 n.35, 397 (1978).
96. QUINCY'S REPoRTS, supra note 95, at 51-57.
97. For details, see Amar, Bill ofRights, supra note 3, at 1176 n.208.
98. See supra note 2 (listing sources quoting Adams).
99. For a somewhat similar suggestion, see SMITH, supra note 95, at 250-54, 380, 384, 466, 508,
518.
100. See O.M. Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause Of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF TIlE
AMERICAN REVOLlmON 40, 43 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1939).
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nies after the 1767 Townshend ACt. IOI These cases were, I think, more
significant at the time than the 1761 Boston case, but I suspect that it is
probably most plausible to see all of these later cases as powerfully
shaped by America's interest in the intervening and far more famous Eng-
lish cases of Wilkes and Entick. 102
This seems more consistent with various data. Both the words of the
.Massachusetts and federal Constitution seem to track Wilkes and Entick
more than Paxton; they speak of warrants not writs, ap.d highlight persons
and papers as well as houses. Many references to Wilkes and Entick, and
to their principles, appear in debates surrounding the Constitution and Bill
of Rights; not so with the writs of assistance. The Declaration of Indepen-
dence makes no mention of abusive searches and seizures in America-an
omission hard to explain if the American Paxton's Case was on
everjone's mind and lips, but wholly consistent with the fame of the Eng-
lish Wilkes and Entick cases. And "Wilkes" and "Camden" undoubtedly
dot the map of early America more than "OtiS."I03
It remains to ask two questions about the writs of assistance themselves.
First, why did Otis and other Bostonians object so much to these devices?
And second, why, in England, did judges strike down general warrants but
uphold the writs of assistance? .
The general writs and the Parliamentary statutes that underlay them, as
many of you will no doubt recall, authorized customs officers-without
probable cause, or individualized suspicion-to break and enter houses,
shops, and "any . . . other place" in search of uncustomed goods.104 Such
a regime seems offensive on several counts. First, it provided next to no
guidance constraining the discretion of officers, thus inviting discrimina-
tion against government enemies and favoritism towards friends. lOS Sec-
ond, it authorized intrusions into houses-the most private buildings imag-
inable. Third, the writ of assistance scheme theoretically authorized cus-
toms officers to commandeer-to dragoon, or impress-ordinary passersby
to aid them in their invasions. I06 This "assistance" power added a vague
101. See id at 49-75.
102. See SMI1lf, supra note 95, at 6,462,476,497.
103. Yet another clue: In Joseph Story's landmark 1833 treatise on the Constitution (published in
Boston and Cambridge) the great Justice (then a Cambridge resident) highlights the 1763 English
general warrants controversy but makes no mention of Otis or the writs of assistance in his brief dis-
cussion of the Fourth AmendmenL See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON TIlE CONS'lTIUIlON OF
TIlE UNITED STATES § 1895, at 748-50 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833).
104. See Dickerson, supra note 100, at 45 n. 6.
105. See SMI1lf, supra note 95, at 101-02, 122, app. M at 563.
106. See SMI1lf, supra note 95, at 29-30, 33, 277 n.8; Dickerson, supra note 100, at 45 n.6 (writ
commanding assistance of "all others"); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amend-
ment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 257, 284 n.l48 (1984); if. Jon C. Blue, High Noon Revisited: Commands
ofAssistance by Peace Officers in the Age of the Fourth Amendment, 101 YAlE LJ. 1475 (1992).
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and possibly tyrannical new layer of bodily intrusion and unchecked dis-
cretion into the system. Finally, the objects of the search-relatively inno-
cent "uncustomed" goods like tea and sugar-were not nearly so compel-
ling as stolen goods, at least in a town, like colonial Boston, where cus-
toms evasion and tax evasion were practically a way of life, implicating a
. good many otherwise law-abiding folk. 1D7 In other words, untaxed sugar
in homes seems more like skim milk than like bombs. All of the foregoing
factors, 1 suggest, would be relevant to a proper reasonableness analysis,
under the Fourth Amendment.
In light of all this, we must ask ourselves why some of the very same
English judges who struck down general warrants upheld writs of assis-
tance. At one level, the answer may be obvious: Parliament had not ex-
plicitly authorized general warrants, but it had by statute authorized writs
of assistance. English judges, in general, had no authority to invalidate
Acts of Parliament. But this pushes the question up one level: why did
Parliament continue to permit writs of assistance even after Parliament
went on record, shortly after Wilkes and Entick, as opposed to certain
types of warrants?l08
Part of the answer may be that the Wilkes and Entick warrants were
directly aimed at political dissenters and political papers.109 As 1 have
already noted, free expression concerns should loom large in any frame-
work organized around constitutional reasonableness rather than a warrant
requirement or a probable cause requirement. But if my overall analysis is
right, we should also look closely at the immunity issue. For 1 have sug-
gested that lawful warrants-because they immunized-had to be strictly
limited. If, however, the writs of assistance offered less immunity, perhaps
this might explain why they were somewhat less offensive.
Evidence from several English cases supports this hypothesis. In the
ftrst, decided in 1769 in the Court of Common Pleas, one Redshaw
brought a trespass suit against Brook and other defendants. Defendants
were "custom-house offtcers" who conducted a suspicionless search for
prohibited and uncustomed goods in Redshaw's house, and came up emp-
ty. The jury awarded a whopping 200 pounds to plaintiff, and the Lord
Chief Justice upheld the verdict: "I cannot say the jury have done
wrong.,,110
107. See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE LJ. 393,
404-09 (1995).
108. On Parliament's condemnation of certain warrants in 1766, see TAYLOR, supra note 27, at 34-
35. On Parliament's reaffinnation of writs of assistance in 1767, see SMJTI{, supra note 95, at 438-64.
109. Two of the three Parliamentary resolutions condemning certain warrants after Wilkes and
Ennck highlighted issues of papers and expression. See Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures ofPapers, 71 VA. L. REv. 869, 909-10 (1985). For a general overview, see id. at 869-915.
110. Redshaw v. Brook, 2 Wils. K. B. 405, 405,95 Eng. Rep. 887,888 (C.P. 1769).
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The brief report in Redshaw does not make clear whether defendants
sought to hide behind a writ of assistance, but the issue arose again a year
later in the Common Pleas case of Bruce v. Rawlins.1Il Here, the defen-
dants broke into a house, found nothing, and left saying-and this is a
direct quote from the case-"Damn it, there are no goodS!,,1I2 When
sued in trespass, they tried to hold up a writ assistance as a shield, but the
jury found for plaintiff, and awarded 100 pounds of damages. The Court
upheld the verdict, following Redshaw. Only Justice Gould explicitly dis-
cussed the writ defense, and he stressed that defendants had failed to
strictly comply with the writ, since they had not brought a constable along
with them.113
Neither Redshaw nor Bruce carefully discussed writs of assistance, but
the issue resurfaced and was crisply addressed in a 1785 King's Bench
case. In Cooper v. Boot,II4 Lord Mansfield observed in dicta that
writs-unlike warrants-did not immunize for unsuccessful searches:
We think the Excise officer cannot be guilty of a trespass, either in pro-
curing or executing the warrant. ... It is a solecism [that is, a contradic-
tion in terms] to say that the regular execution of a legal warrant shall be
a trespass. . . . The case of the writ of assistance is not applicable. There
is no warrant, and all is left to the discretion of the officer, besides,
which is very material, there is a positive clause in the Statute of Charles
2, which makes the whole depend on the actual finding of goods. I IS
As Lord Mansfield pithily put the point earlier, from the bench, "under
a writ of assistance you must find the goods, but not under a war-
rant.,,116
This line of analysis was foreshadowed in the argument of Otis's col-
league, Oxenbridge Thacher, in Paxton's Case itself,1I7 and also ap-
peared in a key footnote drafted by "Horace Gray, Jr., Esq., of the Boston
111. 3 Wils. K. B. 61,61-64,95 Eng. Rep. 934 (C.P. 1770).
112. ld. at 61, 95 Eng. Rep. at 934-35.
113. ld. at 63, 95 Eng. Rep. at 935.
114. 4 Doug}. 339, 99 Eng. Rep. 911 (K.B. 1785).
115. ld. at 348-49, 99 Eng. Rep. at 916 (emphasis added); cf. Cooper v. Booth, 3 Esp. 135, 145-46,
170 Eng. Rep. 564, 568 (K.B. 1785) (same case) (reporting similar language of Lord Mansfield).
116. Cooper v. Boot, 4 Dougl. at 343, 99 Eng. Rep. at 913 (emphasis added); see also Cooper v.
Booth, 3 Esp. at 138, 170 Eng. Rep. at 565 (Lord Mansfield) ("the distinction I have always taken is
this, that to justify under a writ of assistance, the officer must fmd the goods he searches for; but a
warrant will justify without"). Cooper v. Boot's holding-that a proper warrant immunized the officer
for a search that turned up nothing-was applied to seizures. under warrant, where the officer seized
goods that ultimately turned out to be innocent, in the 1800 Court of Common Pleas case Price v.
Messenger, 3 Bos. & Put. 158, 158 n.(a), 126 Eng. Rep. 1213, 1213 n.(a) (C.P. 1800).
117. See Gray's Notes, supra note 95, app. I at 471 & n.(9). For discussion, see SMITH, supra note
95, at 13 n.9, 310. Otis made a similar suggestion in an anonymous essay. See id. at 424, app. M at
563; see also id. at 333 n. 3, app. G at 538 (noting similar suggestion in an influential 1760 London
Magazine article). .
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Bar," in his celebrated Notes on the writs of assistance in the famous
volume, Quincy's Reports. (Need I say where this volume was published?)
According to Gray-who would go on to become Chief Justice of Massa-
chusetts and an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court-"it
was well settled law that a person searching under a writ of assistance and
fmding nothing was not justified."1IS This was, apparently, also Lord
Camden's view in an unpublished case, Shipley v. Redmain, which was
described by counsel in Cooper; 119 and it was the view put forth by
Chief Justice De Grey in the 1774 case of Bostock v. Saunders. 1'1D By
contrast, as Blackstone made clear both in his treatise and on the bench in
Bostockl21 , a lawful warrant "will at all events indemnify [that is, immu-
nize] the officer."I22
Now, for the reasons I have already mentioned, this difference between
writs and warrants is not in my view enough to render the writs of assis-
tance constitutionally reasonable: the writ immunized whenever an officer
found 'untaxed sugar or tea in a home, and I would consider such intru-
sive, ill-justified, and probably discriminatory searches unreasonable even
if successful. (And of course, no one in America ever voted for the law in
the fIrSt place.) But the English cases, I suggest, do help explain why
general warrants were in one key way even worse than general writs. This
key difference-immunity-fits nicely into my overall analytic and histori-
cal argument about why warrants were so dangerous. Thus, I am grateful
to Boston's Professor Maclin for prodding me to revisit the issue of writs
and warrants. And I am grateful to you all for giving me a fitting occasion
to do so-and for inviting me back to one of my favorite cities.
118. Gray's Notes, supra note 95, app. I at 533 nAI; see also SMITH, supra note 95, at 128 n.5.
119. Cooper v. Boot, 4 Dougl. at 347, 99 Eng. Rep. at 915 (recording argument of Plumer).
120. 2 Black W. 912, 914-16, 96 Eng. Rep. 539, 540 (C.P. In3).
121. See id. at 915-16, 96 Eng. Rep. at 540 (opinion of Blackstone, J.) (instrument at hand "is im-
properly called a warrant" and thus it does not immunize at all events).
122. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 10, at 288 (1st ed. 1765). Later editions refined
and expanded this language to make clear that under English statutes even certain defective warrants
could immunize. American law, it seems, tracked the more narrow ftrst edition formulation. See Amar,
Fourth Amendment, supra note 5, at 779-81 & nn.86, 89, 91-92; cj. Davies Testimony, supra note II,
at 10 n.9, 23 n.21 (seriously misstating my position on this issue).
